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One of the main characteristics of LCCs (low-cost carriers) is short 
turnaround times (Barret, 2004), which allows these airlines to maximize the 
number of flights per day and airplane utilization. If these short turnaround times 
cannot be met, the LCC’s on-time performance will suffer. Hence for LCCs, the 
airtime of their airplanes is seemingly more important than customer satisfaction. 
Traditional airlines, in turn, allow longer ground times in exchange for better on-
time performance and thus happier customers. Good on-time performance is of 
increasing importance to LCCs too, as they are trying to attract delay-sensitive 
customers from the business segment (Klophaus, Conrady & Fichert, 2012). So 
far, little research has been directed to the comparison between low-cost carriers 
and traditional airlines regarding on-time performance and scheduled turnaround 
times.  
 
Jetzki (2009) published the latest and most comprehensive work on this 
issue, showing differences between low-cost carriers and traditional scheduling 
models in terms of ground times and the ability to absorb delay. While different 
strategies to minimize delay amongst different carriers were identified, the 
company names were not disclosed due to confidentiality reasons. Even after 
Jetzki’s study, it is still unclear whether traditional airlines should change their 
turn around model to improve efficiency while still maintaining customer 
satisfaction.  
 
This paper is intended as a first step to close this gap in research by 
examining airlines’ on-time performance, turnaround scheduling practices, and 
block times exemplarily at Valencia airport and correlating these values to the 
carriers’ financial performance. To avoid confidentiality issues, this is done by 
using publicly available data from flightradar24.com. Under investigation will be 
the three industry leaders in European LCC operations, Ryanair (FR), EasyJet 
(U2), and Eurowings (EW), and for comparison two successful network airlines, 
Lufthansa (LH) and British Airways (BA). 
 
Review of Literature 
 
The Business Case of European Low-Cost Carriers 
 
Over the last three decades, the low-cost segment in Europe’s airline 
business has risen dramatically, gaining a market share of 41% in 2016 in the EU 
(Airbus, 2016). Consequently, and for economic reasons, traditional airlines had 
to adapt their business models and increasingly adopt LCC-type strategies. To 
differentiate LCCs from traditional airlines, Klophaus et al. (2012) have identified 
13 criteria, which are usually found in the low-cost segment: Secondary airport 
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usage, point-to-point services only, no code sharing, one-way fares only, no more 
than one fare at any time, no more than two fares at any time, single class cabin, 
no complimentary in-flight service with lowest fare category, complimentary in-
flight service with highest fare category, no free checked baggage with lowest 
fare category, free checked baggage with highest fare category, no frequent flyer 
program. If a low-cost airline satisfied all 13 criteria, it reached a reference value 
of one. Vice versa, if an airline – for example, Lufthansa – scored not a single 
low-cost criterion, this led to an overall reference value of zero.  
 
While Ryanair scored first with a reference value of one, the average score 
of all examined 21 European carriers in the year 2012 was 0.54. However, 
Ryanair has announced to offer connecting flights (Ryanair, 2017) since then and 
EasyJet started the distribution of tickets through a global distribution system 
(Sabre, 2016). These examples show that LCCs themselves start shifting their 
business models toward more traditional ways to earn money in air transportation, 
mainly through the selection of primary airports and routes and by attracting 
customers via new fare structures and services.  
 
Maximizing Utilization Through Short Ground Times 
 
One remaining significant difference between LCCs and traditional 
airlines is the turnaround of an airplane between landing (precisely: the on-block 
time of the aircraft) and next takeoff (precisely: the off-block time of the aircraft). 
The scheduled length of a turnaround is a trade-off between aircraft utilization 
rate and the ability to absorb delay, thereby maintaining on-time performance. 
The significant advantage of LCCs in comparison to traditional airlines has 
always been their ability to turn around aircraft on the ground quicker. This ability 
leads to higher utilization of the aircraft, as the plane spends comparatively more 
time in the air through a more substantial number of flights per day (Barret, 
2004). Short turnaround times can be achieved by 1) cleaning the cabin between 
flights by the cabin crew instead of a ground crew, 2) reduced food service on 
board, and 3) reduced delivery process (if at all), and 4) optimized turnaround 
procedures (Barret, 2004).  
 
Short ground times are easier to achieve at smaller airports due to shorter 
taxi times and a by comparison larger number of available gates (Barret, 2004). 
However, the advantage of short turnarounds decreases with increasing travel 
distance, as more extended airtime per flight leads to fewer turnarounds per day 
(Belobaba, 2016).  
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The disadvantage of short ground times is the missing slack time that is 
often used to absorb previously generated delay. This leads to a greater degree of 
vulnerability to disturbances and therefore delay cascades quickly throughout the 
system. LCCs seem to be generally less capable of absorbing delay in comparison 
to other airlines, and Jetzki (2009) pointed out that “every minute of primary 
delay created more than one minute of reactionary delay for this type of business 
model” (p. 41). Fricke and Schultz (2009) have investigated turnarounds of 
traditional Lufthansa operations at Munich and Frankfurt and found that pilots 
were only able to absorb 4.5 minutes of delay on an average leg length of 79 
minutes, which indicates that in-air options for absorbing delay are insufficient.  
 
In contrast to traditional airlines, LCCs are usually scheduling shorter 
ground times to increase aircraft utilization rates, even at the cost of lower on-
time performance and a large portion of reactionary delay.  
 
The Costs of Delay 
 
Low on-time performance values are generally considered undesirable 
because they generate costs for airlines and passengers alike with an enormous 
impact on the economic performance of an airline. Cook and Tanner (2015) found 
that 15 minutes of delay at the gate usually cost 550€ for an A320 or a B738, two 
aircraft models frequently used by LCCs. These values roughly double for enroute 
delays, for example, due to arrival management at busy airports or for re-routing 
due to air traffic flow management (ATFM) regulations. 
 
While many aspects of delay can be calculated easily through input 
variables such as crew and fuel costs, maintenance, and reactionary delay factors, 
other aspects such as passenger cost remains a vague guess. Cook and Tanner 
(2015) differentiate between ‘hard costs’ such as rebooking, compensation, and 
care and ‘soft costs’ including passenger dissatisfaction and customer disloyalty.  
 
Counterintuitively, early arrivals may also be costly for airlines as gates 
may be still blocked. Hao and Hanson (2013) estimate costs for early arrivals to 
be below the costs for delays, but still considerable for airlines when planning 
their schedules. Cook (2007) indicated that “just five minutes of unused buffer, at-
gate, for a B767-300ER, would amount to well over €50,000 over a period of one 
year, on just one leg per day” (p. 118). While this aircraft type is much larger than 
the types usually used by European low-cost carriers, the example illustrates the 
importance of on-time performance and adequately scheduled block times, which 
will be discussed in the following section. 
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In sum, any form of positive or negative delay will result in additional 
costs for an airline. However, late arrivals and the associated reactionary delay 
will generate considerably more costs for airlines than early arrivals. Those early 
arrivals may be planned as idle times for crew and aircraft and may help to absorb 
previously generated delay. Depending on the specific situation of serviced 
airports, early arrivals may be useful to prevent the build-up of delay. 
 
The Importance of Managing Block Times 
 
Delay is always associated with cost. Hence, the scheduling of appropriate 
block times is of great importance to minimize the build-up of delay. Hao and 
Hansen (2013) have demonstrated that ample block time scheduling is a powerful 
tool to improve an airline’s on-time performance – however at the cost of 
efficiency and utilization rates. For new routes, airlines at first estimate the 
required block time in advance based on flight plans. As soon as actual data is 
gathered, most airlines adopt the scheduled block time accordingly. Block time 
setting techniques vary. Some airlines set a single block time for a specific route 
for an entire year, while other carriers consider seasons of the year, days of the 
week, and time of the day.  
 
Even though LCCs increasingly converge their business models toward 
traditional airlines in Europe, their on-time performance still lags behind 
traditional carriers, and there are no indications that LCCs strive to close this gap 
and improve their on-time performance (Flightontime.info, 2017). It seems that 
from an economic standpoint, a lower on-time performance overall outweighs the 
associated costs. Hence, it is the purpose of this study to evaluate whether there is 
still a difference between the on-time performance of LCCs and traditional 
airlines. As a case study, this study will examine the scheduled turnaround times, 
and block-time setting practices at Valencia airport (VLC) and correlate the 
findings to the airlines’ financial performance.  
 
Method 
 
 This quantitative study sought to determine if the economic gains of lower 
on-time performance of low-cost carriers outweigh the costs. The following data 
were analyzed to evaluate such costs and benefits. 
 
Flight Data 
 
Data for flights operated by Ryanair, EasyJet, Eurowings, Lufthansa, and 
British Airways to and from the airport of Valencia (Spain) was retrieved from 
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flightradar24.com. The airport was selected for two reasons: First, it is located in 
a region that is frequently visited by travelers from northern Europe and is, 
therefore, a destination for LCCs and traditional airlines alike. Second, the 
number of flight movements is large enough to expect a sufficiently large data set. 
Finally, the flight time between the airport and several northern European 
Destinations is approximately the same (DUS, FRA, LGW, LTN, MUC, STR: 
113 – 131 minutes), which is relevant for the evaluation of block times. Data were 
retrieved for July, August, and September 2017.  
 
The data may be expected to be highly reliable due to the method used by 
flightradar24.com collecting the data. Errors are expected to be within +/- one 
minute due to the quick changes in airspeed, altitude, and position during takeoff 
and landing. Besides reliability, the validity of the data may be considered high 
for flight times between the airports. For some calculations, average taxi times 
were added to average flight times to calculate average delay and block times. 
Duration and delay were converted into minutes and analyzed through an 
ANOVA.  
 
Table 1 
Formulas 
departure delay 
= Actual takeoff time (ATT) – standard departure time 
(STD)  
arrival delay 
= Actual landing time (ATL) – standard arrival time 
(STA) 
scheduled turnaround 
time 
= Scheduled departure time STD (subsequent flight) – 
scheduled arrival time (STA) (preceding flight) 
actual ground time 
= Actual departure time (ATD) (subsequent flight) – 
actual arrival time (ATA) (preceding flight) 
scheduled block time = STA - STD 
Note. All results are calculated in minutes. Delay is positive when aircraft are late. 
 
Financial Data 
 
Financial Data was retrieved from the respective annual reports of all 
carriers (British Airways plc., 2017; EasyJet, 2016; Lufthansa, 2017; Ryanair, 
2016) as available for the financial year 2016. On-time performance was only 
reported by Ryanair, and data was completed through numbers from an OAG 
(2016) report for the other carriers.  
 
Possible major one-off effects mentioned in the annual reports were 
corrected and the data was then organized along with the operational performance 
5
Waltenberger and Ruff-Stahl: Implications of Short Scheduled Ground Times
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018
  
indicators in a table to allow easy comparison for the reader. Due to the definition 
of the financial year for all carriers, no data was available to match the study 
period with current numbers from the summer 2017 season.  
 
Hypothesis 
 
It is hypothesized that the economic gains of lower on-time performance 
of low-cost carriers outweigh the costs. 
 
Results 
 
The findings revealed significant differences among the various carriers, 
however not along the lines between low-cost-carriers and traditional airline 
models. Significant differences were found for on-time performance, turnaround 
scheduling strategies, actual turnaround lengths, and block-time calculations.  
 
On-Time Performance 
 
In this section, the actual takeoff-times of all carriers were compared 
through statistical analysis. Figure 1 and Table 2 show the results and indicate that 
there are two groups of airlines, which are not divided by the traditional 
separating line that was expected to be found between low-cost and non-low-cost 
operations. 
 
The first group consists of the two legacy airlines British Airways and 
Lufthansa, as well as Ryanair as a quite punctual base operator at VLC. 
Eurowings and EasyJet make up the second group with a significantly lower on-
time performance, which was confirmed through an ANOVA analysis with F(4, 
1052) = 51.91, p < 0.0001. A post hoc Tukey HSD test (see table A2) revealed 
that the differences between Ryanair and Lufthansa, between Ryanair and British 
Airways, between Lufthansa and British Airways, and between EasyJet and 
Eurowings were not significant. All other comparisons between the carriers 
showed significant differences in on-time departure performance.  
 
Similar results regarding statistical significance were found for the arrival 
delays of flights originating from VLC. Only Ryanair and Lufthansa touched 
down on average before their scheduled on-block time. All other carriers seemed 
to operate on average late on their routes from Valencia. 
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Figure 1. Boxplot of departure delay for flights leaving from VLC. Whiskers identify 
extreme values.  
Table 2 
Delay for Flights Departing from VLC 
   Departure Delay 
 
Arrival Delay  
MD - MA 
Carrier  Abbreviation n MD SD 
 
MA SD  
Ryanair FR 300 17.1 27.5  -1.5 28.2  18.6 
EasyJet U2 310 38.5 31.4  22.5 32.3  16.0 
Eurowings EW / 4Ua 143 37.7 31.8  19.7 34.5  18.0 
Lufthansa LH 229 18.3 14.3  -6.1 13.6  24.4 
British Airways BA 75 25.7 22.2  2.8 22.4  22.9 
Note. All results are calculated in minutes. Delay is positive when aircraft are late. 
a Germanwings (4U) was included because it operates exclusively as a contractor for EW.  
Turnarounds 
 
As noted earlier, a quick and efficient turnaround is key to high equipment 
productivity, and thus a primary component of the current low-cost strategy. 
Therefore, turnarounds at VLC airport were compared for on-time performance 
above. Because only STA (standard time of arrival), ATL (actual landing time), 
STD (standard departure time), and ATT (actual takeoff time) were available, the 
calculation of the actual turnaround times required a two-step process. In a first 
step, average taxi-in (M = 4, SD = 2) and taxi-out times (M = 11, SD = 4) from 
summer 2016 were added to the actual landing time (ATL) and subtracted from 
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the actual takeoff time (ATT) of each flight. Average taxi times were retrieved 
from EUROCONTROL (2016a, 2016b) and are depicted in Table A1.  
 
In a second step, early arrivals that were still early after the addition of 
taxi-in time were set to schedule on-block time for further data evaluation. This 
was necessary to count only those turnarounds as longer-than-scheduled that 
exceeded the scheduled off-block time. Otherwise, an aircraft that arrived ten 
minutes early at the gate would have been considered late regarding scheduled 
turnaround time, even if it left five minutes before scheduled off-block time. The 
results are depicted in Table 3, which indicates significant differences among the 
different airlines for scheduled turnaround lengths and actual durations.  
 
Table 3 
Scheduled and Actual Turnaround Times at VLC 
  
 
Scheduled  Actual a 
 
Carrier  n 
 
MS SD Median  MA SD Median MS - MA 
Ryanair 207 
 
54.9 35.9 45  50.4 33.5 39 4.5 
EasyJet 310 
 
35.0 0 35  47.0 16.6 42 -12.0 
Eurowings 143 
 
40.0 0 40  49.5 19.2 44 -9.5 
Lufthansa 139 
 
49.2 4.2 50  50.2 9.9 49 -1.0 
British Airways 75 
 
46.7 3.8 45  55.8 17.4 50 -9.1 
Note. All turnarounds included other than night stops.  
a Actual turnaround times were calculated by subtracting early arrivals and average taxi 
times from the actual ground time. 
The method for data retrieval for Ryanair as the only home-based carrier 
in this study allowed the calculation of some additional information, which was 
not available for the other airlines. Out of a total of 92 days, the virtual FR aircraft 
completed six legs on 59 days and eight legs on only 29 days during that period. 
The average flight time was 97 minutes. Long turnarounds seemed to coincide 
quite often with necessary crew-changes, for example after two or four legs at 
home-base. 
 
Block Times 
 
Hao and Hansen (2013) pointed out the correct set of scheduled block 
times to minimize costs for airlines. Therefore it was expected that all airlines 
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operating to and from VLC would set block times in a similar manner because the 
expenses for this procedure are expected to be low in comparison to the 
mentioned costs of positive and negative delay in the literature review. 
 
Average scheduled block times (ASBT) were calculated and compared to 
the sum of the average flight time and the average taxi-in, and taxi-out time at the 
respective airports (Table A1), which represent average actual block times 
(AABT). The difference between AABT and ASBT was calculated for each city-
pair, and a weighted average was then retrieved for every carrier. Ryanair was 
excluded from the calculations due to the relatively small number of flights 
operated on each route it offers from VLC. The carrier conducted a maximum of 
20 flights on the VLC-SCQ route (and vice versa), a number that was deemed too 
small to calculate a meaningful average. In contrast to the assumptions based on 
Hao and Hansen (2013), the differences among the four carriers are large and the 
setting of scheduled block times seems to have different importance to each of the 
carriers, as the results in Table 4 indicate. 
 
EasyJet (U2) achieved the lowest weighted average in this study due to the 
good fit of the scheduled block times for the route between LGW (London 
Gatwick) and VLC, which was only one minute off for both directions. The routes 
from and to LTN (London Luton) included more generously scheduled block 
times, but due to the smaller number of flights, the impact on the weighted 
average was limited. U2 is the only carrier in this study that used scheduled block 
times, which varied depending on daytime and weekday. 
 
Due to the limited number of considered routes for this case study, data 
may differ considerably on other routes operated by the airlines. However, trends 
are most probably observable for all routes and without much doubt, the type of 
scheduled block times (variable/fixed) is constant over the whole network. 
 
Financial Performance and Key Markers 
 
The financial performance of all three low-cost carriers differed 
significantly in the financial year 2016. FR achieved the highest absolute profit 
and was at the same time able to reach the largest profit margin (26.4%). This was 
partially due to a one-off “gain of €317.5 million on the sale of the Company’s . . 
. shareholding in Aer Lingus” (Ryanair, 2016, p. 95). In contrast, EasyJet reached 
a significantly lower profit per passenger and per aircraft, which also resulted in a 
lower, but still, impressive profit margin (14.6%) compared to other players in the 
industry. Eurowings is the only carrier in this study, which was not able to reach 
profitability in 2016. The company was restructured lately and profits are spread 
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over a large network of affiliated companies and airlines that cooperate with 
Eurowings (Lufthansa Group, 2017). Results are displayed in Table 6. 
 
Table 4 
Block Time Comparison 
Airline City Pair n ASBT AABT Delta a Type b 
Wt 
Avg 
U2 LGW-VLC 271 139 138 1 variable 
0.7 
 VLC-LGW 271 148 149 -1 variable 
 LTN-VLC 39 151 145 6 variable 
 VLC-LTN 39 148 143 5 variable 
        
EW DUS-VLC 91 150 144 6 fixed 
5.3 
 VLC-DUS 91 140 143 -3 fixed 
 STR-VLC 52 140 127 13 fixed 
 VLC-STR 52 140 129 11 fixed 
        
LH FRA-VLC 183 140 136 4 fixed 
4.5 
 VLC-FRA 181 145 140 5 fixed 
 MUC-VLC 49 140 138 2 fixed 
 VLC-MUC 48 140 133 7 fixed 
        
BA LGW-VLC 75 145 136 9 fixed 
7.0 
 VLC-LGW 75 150 145 5 fixed 
Note. All times are calculated in minutes. 
a Delta = ASBT – AABT; Negative numbers indicate an overshoot of the scheduled block 
time. 
b The type field indicates if block times are scheduled with a fixed length (fixed) or if 
variation (variable) occurs depending on the time of the day or other variables. 
c Weighted average 
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Table 6 
Financial Performance of LCCs and network airlines in FY2016 
Carrier  FR a U2 a EW a LH a,e BA a 
Profit Margin 21.5 % b 14.6 % < 0 f 7.4% f 12.1 % 
Load Factor 92.8 % 91.6 % 79.6 % 79.1 % 81.2 % 
On-time Performance 
(STA + 15 minutes) 
> 90 % 75 % c 
4U 91 % c 
EW 90 % c 
82.4 % c 78.4 % g 
Profit Before Tax [million] 1,404 € 405 £ -91 € d 1,135 € d 1,566 £ 
 Per PAX 13.20 € b 6.77 £ < 0 18.18 € 35.19 £ 
 Per aircraft [million] 4.01 € b 1.93 £ < 0 3.24 € 5.34 £ 
a All data extracted from respective business reports (Ryanair, 2016, EasyJet, 2016, 
Lufthansa, 2016, British Airways Plc.,2017) unless otherwise stated. b Corrected by the 
one-off effect of Air Lingus shares sale. c Datum from OAG (2016) d adjusted EBIT (EBT 
not reported). e Lufthansa Passenger Airlines including regional partners f EBIT Margin g  
Datum Oct 16 to Sep 2017 from OAG (2017) 
Discussion 
 
The on-time performance results are in line with the research conducted 
by Jetzki (2009) who noted that “one low-cost carrier notably runs on a different 
strategy” (p. 58), without naming the airline. After the results presented above, 
this airline can now be identified as Ryanair with the utmost probability. And 
unexpectedly, the results do not indicate that LCCs calculate more delay than 
other airlines. At Valencia airport, Ryanair shows even better on-time 
performance than traditional carriers.  
 
While Ryanair enjoys the reputation of turning around aircraft in 30 
minutes or less, the data obtained at VLC indicate differently. Here, Ryanair 
completed 509 turnarounds other than night stops, with a mean duration of 40 
minutes (Mdn = 30, SD = 31.9). This means that half of their turnarounds must 
have been planned to last more than 30 minutes. In fact, at VLC there was not a 
single instance in which an aircraft from their fleet was scheduled to be turned 
around within 30 minutes for two consecutive turnarounds, and half of their 
turnarounds at VLC were scheduled to last more than 45 minutes. 
 
It is remarkable that Ryanair, rated as the most low-cost-orientated carrier 
by Klophaus et al. in 2012, did not plan the expected short turnaround times at 
VLC. Instead, Ryanair used scheduling practices, which are closer to those used 
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by Lufthansa and British Airways than other low-cost carriers. This indicates that 
Ryanair’s good on-time performance may a result of considerably longer 
scheduled turnarounds in comparison to their LCC-competitors.  
 
In comparison, Ryanair is the only carrier that completed its turnarounds 
on average faster than scheduled, with Lufthansa following second. With a 
median of 45 minutes for scheduled turnaround times, Ryanair, along with 
Lufthansa (50 minutes) and British Airways (45 minutes) differs considerably 
from other LCCs such as Easy Jet and Eurowings. On average and remarkable 
due to the associated costs, Ryanair flights arrived early. Arriving early allowed 
Ryanair to effectively absorb delay built during turnarounds at VLC, thus 
achieving good on-time performance values at this airport.  
 
In general, carriers may decide to either trade on-time performance for 
higher utilization rates or accept lower airtime per airplane and day in exchange 
for better punctuality and customer satisfaction. Ryanair seems to prioritize being 
on-time, while EasyJet seems to accept a delay to achieve better utilization rates.  
 
Eurowings and EasyJet came in last regarding on-time performance. In 
contrast to all other airlines, Eurowings was not able to depart early in a single 
instance; hence, turnaround procedures and practices seem to differ significantly 
from those used by Ryanair. In fact, Eurowings spent on average ten minutes 
longer at the parking position than intended. However, an evaluation of block 
time settings did not reveal any strategic reasoning behind this delay. 
 
Ryanair mastered the two-fold trade-off problem between aircraft 
utilization and on-time performance best by combining the company’s ability to 
turn around aircraft quickly with efficient scheduling, which allows sufficient 
ground time to absorb delays and operational disturbances. In contrast, EasyJet 
had the largest overshoot of scheduled turnaround times due to tightly scheduled 
block times, which led to a considerably lower on-time performance.  
 
The success of these various ground operations strategies can ultimately 
only be measured in economic terms. Out of the three LCCs in this study, Ryanair 
is the most profitable company. In contrast, Easy Jet exhibits similar load factors 
as Ryanair and an albeit lower (nevertheless impressive) profit margin but shows 
significantly lower on-time performance.  
 
Eurowings, in turn, underwent a restructuring process in 2016 and its 
parent company Lufthansa is still investing considerable amounts of money to 
enable the growth of this LCC in the highly competitive European low-cost 
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market. Due to these circumstances, Eurowings was not profitable in 2016, and no 
correlations between financial performance and its operational strategy can yet be 
made.  
 
The two hub-and-spoke airlines Lufthansa and British Airways, which 
were included in this paper for similar reasons, reached a lower profit margin in 
2016 along with significantly lower load factors than the LCCs. However, both 
companies generated an overall more profit per passenger than any of the low-
cost airlines. This may be due to their large long-haul fleets and the associated 
higher prices customers are willing to pay for their services – to include reliable 
on-time performance. However, as this study has shown, the alleged better on-
time performance of traditional carriers may be nothing more than a myth.   
 
The hypothesis that the gains of lower on-time performance of low-cost 
carriers outweigh the associated costs must be rejected based on the results found 
for Ryanair and Easy Jet. While both airlines reach high-profit margins, Ryanair 
operates more profitable and shows higher on-time performance values at the 
same time. Apart from that, the findings of this study support the theory that 
hybridization of the European low-cost sector, which was first proposed by 
Klophaus et al. in 2012, has advanced to an operational level: LCCs become 
increasingly sensitive toward customer satisfaction.   
 
Overall and on an operational level, economic success seems to be 
associated with the ability of an airline to turn around aircraft quickly, to build 
schedules that incorporate realistic ground and block times with enough buffer to 
absorb delay, and the associated high on-time performance to satisfy customers.  
 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Work 
 
There are some limitations associated with this study and 
recommendations for future work may be derived from most of these. The most 
significant limitation is the close focus on VLC airport, which does not allow 
gaining a larger picture of operational strategies. Only Ryanair’s operation was 
captured through the tail tracking methodology first introduced by Kondo (2008), 
and the results were promising. This methodology seems to provide a useful tool 
for a larger analysis of several airlines and airports over an extended time.  
 
Ryanair performed quite well over the period under evaluation, but it 
remains unclear if the operation from VLC as a home base had an impact on on-
time performance and turnaround times, a topic that requires further investigation. 
Also, the number of flown legs per day was only captured for FR, and further 
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evaluation of the other carriers is necessary to gain an insight into average leg 
lengths and scheduling strategies. This may have a considerable impact on the 
strategy, utilization rate, and personnel requirements. 
 
Ryanair was found to leave before STD in some times, a case that was 
only found in rare circumstances in the data of other carriers. This gives reason to 
suspect that the turnaround strategy of Ryanair may be somewhat different in 
comparison to the strategies of all other airlines and may add to the successful 
performance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The clear line between low-cost and non-low-cost airlines has become 
blurred through the hybridization of the European low-cost market. The observed 
differences between low-cost carriers compared to traditional airlines were small 
regarding on-time performance, turnaround scheduling, block-time setting, and 
turnaround performance at VLC airport. Ryanair’s two-fold strategy as the most 
successful European low-cost carrier consists of the ability to perform short 
turnarounds while allowing a generously planned schedule at the same time, 
which overall results in better on-time performance. EasyJet, in turn, focuses on 
maximizing aircraft utilization through optimized block-time setting, thereby 
accepting a lower on-time performance. 
 
It is likely that the hybridization of the low-cost sector will eventually 
force traditional airlines to follow the business models of their low-cost 
competitors. Consequently, the line between low-cost and traditional airlines will 
be further dissolved.  
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Appendix  
Table A1 
Average Taxi-In and Taxi-Out Times for selected Airports 
Airport  
Taxi-In  Taxi-Out 
M SD Median  M SD Median 
DUS 5 2 5  12 4 11 
FRA 9 4 8  14 6 13 
LGW 7 4 7  20 9 19 
LTN 6 3 5  15 9 13 
MUC 6 2 5  12 8 12 
STR 5 3 5  10 5 10 
VLC 4 2 4  11 4 10 
Note. All results are in minutes. Data was retrieved from EUROCONTROL (2016a, 2016b) for the 
summer 2016. 
 
Table A2 
ANOVA Comparison of Departure Delay including post-hoc Tukey HSD results 
    Tukey’s HSD Comparisons 
Airline n Mean SD FR U2 EW LH 
FR 300 17.1 27.5     
U2 310 38.5 31.4 < .0001    
EW 143 37.7 31.8 < .0001 0.9978   
LH 229 18.3 14.3 0.9841 < .0001 < .0001  
BA 75 25.7 22.2 0.0904 0.0021 0.0161 0.2297 
Note. All results are in minutes. 
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